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Compelled to control
Conflicting visions of the future of cyberspace
The contest for power in cyberspace is of growing 
concern for states and their citizens, whose daily lives are 
increasingly reflected in the digital domain. The ease and 
low cost of networking are driving dramatic expansions 
of connectivity, yet the interdependencies and potential 
risks of that expansion are often poorly understood.1 In 
addition, the challenges of encouraging digital innovation 
while maintaining the stability of cyberspace are beyond the 
capabilities of any single country.
Governments are struggling to understand the political 
and social implications of a world where everyone is 
connected all the time, and where disruptive technologies 
can be developed and disseminated without government 
permission. This environment is strained further by the fact 
that competition on the global stage is mediated increasingly 
through digital means, as states attempt to leverage their 
technical strengths (including military and commercial 
strengths) for political advantage. States busy negotiating 
and manoeuvring among themselves often perceive civil 
society perspectives to be a footnote or an annoyance.
This paper looks at the desire among states for greater 
control over the digital domain. It begins by considering 
the convergence of controlling desires among the major 
cyberpowers, and then examining some of the main 
dynamics of the Russian and Chinese positions. Both those 
countries are attempting to shape the international dialogue 
on cyberspace to suit their preferences. Their positions 
are examined relative to each other and to the Western 
consensus—defined as ‘the views on use and governance 
of the internet that have emerged in the USA, UK and other 
like-minded states—a system of views which forms an 
unstated but nonetheless tangible concurrence’.2 The paper 
analyses the potential implications of those positions for the 
global internet and the impact that developing countries may 
have on the dialogue.3 
Convergence of control
While there are significant and self-evident differences 
between the authoritarian and liberal positions described 
here (which themselves encompass a broad range of 
countries and perspectives), there’s a danger of gradual—and 
illiberal—convergence between the governments of major 
cyberpowers, such as the US, the UK, Russia and China, on 
the levels of internet control they want. In other words, while 
the desired ends—or strategic outcomes—may vary widely 
among the dominant actors, there’s a growing resemblance 
between ways and means—the policies, procedures and 
resources—that those actors and their allies deem necessary 
for protection from cyber insecurity.
The Western consensus is currently receiving significant 
public scrutiny, due in large part to the intelligence 
documents leaked by Edward Snowden and the highly 
controversial actions they revealed.4 This has exposed 
well-established patterns of activity and has in many ways 
confirmed what was already suspected, and more. For a 
variety of reasons, a number of liberal democratic countries 
have gradually constructed cybersecurity policies and legal 
principles that appear to border on the illiberal, and for which 
little or no consent has been sought from the voting public. 
Those actions, and the policies that underpin them, have 
the potential to erode trust and create long-term damage to 
the domestic and international credibility of these countries. 
They may sway undecided countries in illiberal directions, 
and have sobering implications for the health of civil society 
and privacy rights around the globe.
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Most importantly, these actions risk lending credence to a 
narrative of moral equivalence between countries such as the 
US and Russia—countries that would otherwise be positioned 
at the opposite ends of many international debates. Many 
observers will be tempted to think that there’s little to 
distinguish the behaviour of liberal and illiberal governments 
in cyberspace, and in some cases they’d be correct. In 
addition, long-term damage is likely to be done to the 
current Western-dominated model of internet governance 
(which includes government and non-government actors), 
effectively leaving it open to challenge by state-dominated 
models. Whose model of internet governance has the 
potential to see widespread international adoption?
It would be deeply damaging if the main cyberpowers 
coalesce around common visions of intrusive domestic digital 
control, leaving developing countries with the option to join 
the crowd or the minority. There’s a pressing need to counter 
illiberal tendencies, especially when fear of insecurity is 
greatest. Sustained action among liberal governments and 
civil society around the world is necessary to counter these 
tendencies, closely scrutinise political desires for control and 
mastery of the digital domain, and preserve the creativity 
and dynamism made possible by an internet that’s free in 
both perception and reality.
A Russian perspective
The Russian Government position on ‘information 
security’ differs significantly from the Western stance on 
‘cybersecurity’. Whereas Western states acknowledge the 
threat from malicious code and craft policies and doctrine to 
defend themselves, they don’t seek to control or otherwise 
restrict flows of information within or across domestic 
borders. The Russian conception of information security 
encompasses far more than cybersecurity. First, Russia 
views uncontrolled information as a potential threat to the 
state and society. This is an issue of national sovereignty and 
requires control of the national ‘information space’. Second, 
the information doesn’t necessarily have to come from the 
internet. It doesn’t even have to be digital, and could also 
come from radio, TV or newspapers.
According to a former KGB official:
[Russia looks] at information security from the 
international point of view, from the perspective 
of protecting national interests. It’s not about the 
technology only (i.e. the protection of computer 
networks, commanding systems and so on). But it’s also 
the political–ideological area—combating the misuse 
of information technology to undermine the political 
situation, and creating confrontational relationships.5
Russia continues to engage in a lengthy attempt to promote 
this all-encompassing vision of information security to 
sympathetic countries around the globe. A significant 
initiative came in September 2011, when Russia and China 
(along with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) jointly produced the 
International Code of Conduct for Information Security.6 
At the same time, Russia released the Draft Convention on 
International Information Security. Taken together, the two 
documents propose to significantly strengthen the power 
of the state in cyberspace vis-a-vis non-government actors, 
many of which contribute substantially to global internet 
governance. Organisations such as the Internet Engineering 
Task Force and ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers) are largely ignored, as the preamble 
to the code of conduct states that ‘policy authority for 
internet-related public issues is the sovereign right of States.’7 
States would also agree to not ‘carry out hostile activities 
or acts of aggression’, although how that would be enforced 
isn’t specified.
The code of conduct and draft convention are tools for 
promoting a vision of robust state control in cyberspace. In 
the Russian context, this is enacted through an authoritarian 
mentality that’s become entrenched among Russian political 
elites, as Vladimir Putin has alternated from President to 
Prime Minister (and back again) over the past 13 years.
There’s significant friction between this and the Western 
stance, which is more accepting of non-government 
influences in internet governance. Two main differences are 
apparent, the first political and the second technical:
First, they are at odds with Western principles in some of 
their key areas such as ‘national information space’ (also 
described as network sovereignty), state management 
and governance of the internet, and the threat from 
hostile content as well as hostile code. Second, they 
are also dissonant with the everyday work of Russian 
commercial internet service providers and domain name 
authorities, who on a daily basis work to ensure the free 
and unobstructed flow of information across national 
borders simply because this is how the internet presently 
works in real life, as opposed to how some sections of 
Russia’s security elite would wish it to work.8
While neither proposal has gained traction beyond its 
authors, they’re significant attempts by non-Western 
states to shift the narrative on personal online freedom 
towards a state-led and controlled perspective. They 
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provide an alternative vision for undecided countries that 
may lean naturally towards state-dominated models of 
governance, and that side with Russia and China in decrying 
the destabilising potential of the internet and cyberspace 
more broadly.
At the domestic level, and contrary to popular opinion, social 
media platforms in Russia are generally permitted freedom 
of expression.9 In addition, ‘there is no overt censorship of 
social media, as there is in China; at the same time there is 
investment in monitoring and seeding software.’10 However, 
it’s easy to see how an abundance of caution and a nuanced 
understanding of the government’s red lines contribute 
to self-censorship. In Russia this caution is magnified 
by the hazards, which have included severe beatings or 
assassination, of writing stories that are unfavourable to the 
government or corporations.11 The fear of online instability 
fuelled by journalists or social media, and its influence on 
policymakers, shouldn’t be underestimated. For example, 
as the Arab Spring unfolded, the optimistic perspective of 
Russian bloggers and independent media outlets diverged 
significantly from the position of the Russian Government, 
with the latter framing it as a cautionary tale of subversive 
online activity that could be used against Russia.12 
In this environment, the introduction of increasingly intrusive 
online surveillance has been justified in order to mitigate 
the threats of terrorism, criminality and general instability. 
The Russian surveillance program, known as SORM (System 
for Operative Investigative Activities), has the power to 
remotely and automatically gather information from all 
communications media in Russia and store it for several 
years. Internet and telecom service providers are required 
to pay for the installation of surveillance boxes in their 
networks, which only the authorities can access.13 Use of the 
internet in Russia is growing rapidly, and the SORM system is 
being strengthened to compensate. Nearly 60% of Russians 
now use the internet once a week or more, compared with 
less than 10% in 2006 and only 3% in 2001.14 This growth 
in connectivity is likely to continue, in line with intrusive 
government efforts to monitor and control the Russian 
national information space.
A Chinese perspective
As a signatory with Russia to the International Code of 
Conduct for Information Security, China has a stated interest 
in promoting national sovereignty in cyberspace. Both 
countries are closely engaged in all major international 
debates on topics such as internet governance, cybercrime, 
state-sponsored espionage, and offensive actions 
in cyberspace.
There are also similarities in the way both countries view the 
threat from uncontrolled information:
Russia and China seem to favour the use of the term 
control to a much greater extent than the United States. 
This difference is often reflected in internal debates 
and the need to restrict freedom on the web. Another 
common point is that both nations have developed 
long-term cyber plans. For China it is the Informatization 
Development Strategy and for Russia it is the Doctrine of 
Information Security.15
Yet, while they broadly agree on the desirability of state 
control and sovereignty over the internet, there are 
significant differences, particularly related to the challenges 
of implementing that vision. China’s population (1.34 billion) 
is nearly ten times larger than Russia’s (142 million), 
and includes a vibrant and expanding middle class that 
increasingly expects social and economic opportunities to 
continue to grow. Beijing views the greater use of information 
technology, or the ‘informatization’ of Chinese society, ‘as 
a means to ensure sustained economic growth, compete 
globally in the information technology realm, and ensure 
national security. Informatization relies on information 
security systems that can support economic restructuring 
and national security.’16
From exploiting commercial opportunities to reducing 
cybercrime and maintaining national security and stability, 
the challenges faced by Beijing are relevant to its trading 
partners and allies around the globe in a way that eclipses 
Moscow’s reach. This is a challenge for Chinese politicians 
and securocrats, who embrace authoritarianism but 
are often forced to be responsive to the demands of an 
increasingly empowered citizenry. Social media are often 
mentioned as barometers of public engagement and provide 
new ways to organise collectively to expose corruption, 
while at the same time government organs monitor and filter 
online communication in an attempt to maintain stability 
and harmony. Citizens’ demands often gather momentum 
online before moving to the street, and they’re occasionally 
successful when exposing the misdeeds of low- or mid-level 
officials. However, when criticism is directed at Communist 
Party leaders, or when collective action in the physical 
world is encouraged, the security response tends to be swift 
and uncompromising.17
The Communist Party’s stated goals of maintaining political 
stability and single-party rule while opening China’s economy 
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even further to global market forces are particularly difficult. 
Officials often cite foreign influence (particularly political 
influence) as a destabilising factor, and one that requires 
the steady, correcting hand of the state.18 The oft-invoked 
metaphor of the ‘Great Firewall’ is only partly accurate—
Chinese Government strategies of control and coercion are 
more nuanced than popularly believed:
Firewall-type activity does indeed describe aspects of the 
Chinese approach to the internet. But it’s been obvious 
for a while that the subtlety of the regime’s approach to 
managing the network has gone way beyond the binary 
allow/disallow nature of the firewall metaphor. There 
are still occasional ‘completely and immediately delete’ 
instructions to website editors, but because of the rapid 
growth of social media the Chinese have realised that 
blanket bans have become a kind of nuclear option and 
that a more graduated approach is required.19
This nuanced system has been likened to a waterworks or 
a hydraulic project: ‘Water, in this view, is both vital and 
dangerous: it has to be managed.’20 Enough information has 
to be allowed to circulate to satisfy enough of the people 
enough of the time, while not endangering the positions 
of the political elite. This fits the Party’s broader political 
strategy of moving China down the path of becoming a ‘rich, 
strong country’.21 The system of control is laborious but 
delicate, given the ease with which ordinary citizens can now 
make their voices heard. No longer is the elite political class 
the only voice that speaks for China on the international 
stage. It’s now possible for external observers to gain a far 
more nuanced and subtle perspective of how non-elite 
groups in China engage in international and domestic 
debates (including those related to information security) and 
with each other.22
Hacking-related tensions between China and the US have 
increased to a level that’s now worthy of attention from 
leaders of both countries, and although dialogue among 
senior officials is a positive step there’s no guarantee it 
will produce a mutually agreeable outcome. While US 
officials and US-based companies such as Mandiant have 
made frequent and increasingly specific accusations about 
cyberattacks emanating from China, Beijing has only 
recently allowed officials to make statements that go beyond 
repetitive denials and the standard line that ‘China is also a 
victim of cyberattacks.’ A more nuanced strategy appears to 
be emerging, as the old language is coupled with emphasis 
on ‘common exploration and cooperation’ (in particular with 
the US) in order to reduce mutual mistrust.23 In addition, 
organisations such as the China Computer Emergency 
Response Team are highlighting specific details of hacking 
against Chinese networks in an attempt to provide tangible 
evidence of cyberattacks against China.24
Chinese and Russian oppositional stances to Western models 
of internet governance have so far tended to attract the 
expected supporters, for example from post-Soviet states. 
The International Code of Conduct has received minimal 
international support, and the December 2012 World 
Conference on International Telecommunications (which 
dealt in part with aspects of internet governance) ended in 
an impasse.25
But China is making progress on other fronts. It appears to 
be gaining confidence in its ability to negotiate with the US 
as an equal on issues related to cybersecurity and internet 
governance. This may be partly due to improved internal 
coordination among government ministries in Beijing, owing 
to the frequency at which cybersecurity is now discussed at 
senior levels. That confidence is apparent on other sensitive 
issues as well, including during the highly disciplined 
negotiations with the US State Department over Chinese 
dissident Chen Guangcheng, who escaped house arrest and 
took refuge in the US Embassy in Beijing in April 2012.26 This 
internal political coordination and professionalisation are 
likely to improve over time, as China’s interests grow and 
become truly global.
Long-term Implications
In the past 20 years, a full one-third of the world’s population, 
or 2.5 billion people, have been connected to the internet, 
but that pales in comparison with the change that awaits 
us in the next 20 years.27 The private sector understands 
this well, having been the main driver of global digital 
interconnection, but governments are still coming to terms 
with the permissionless innovation permitted by digital 
technologies. Cyberspace is agnostic in this process, serving 
as a magnifying glass for pre-existing social, economic and 
political realities.
Government investment in tools that facilitate greater 
surveillance and control of cyberspace, including offensive 
‘cyberweapons’, appears to dwarf similar investment in 
technologies and policies that can expand global internet 
connectivity in a vibrant and sustainable way.28 In other 
words, the national security priorities of several select actors 
trumps the stability of the global Internet. Social concerns 
regarding online privacy and individual freedom are also 
being challenged. This is, after all, a domain ideally suited 
for observation and surveillance, whether by intelligence 
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agencies trying to improve their situational awareness or by 
companies trying to persuade potential consumers to part 
with their money.
The long-term risks of controlling behaviour could be 
significant. They include undermining the creativity and 
permissionless innovation inherent in the internet, as 
governments in newly connected countries invest in 
technology meant to protect the state against their citizens. 
It could also erode trust between allies and trading partners 
and hasten the fracturing of the internet along commercial 
or political fault lines. The international debate over how 
cyberspace should be governed is perhaps the most 
contentious and far-reaching contest for digital power, and 
in relative terms it’s just begun. An international perspective 
is crucial, as it’s increasingly beyond the ability of any single 
state to dominate cyberspace, no matter how hard some 
may try.
The dominant Western narratives on cyberspace (such as 
that technology is an inherently liberating force) are highly 
malleable, and often fall victim to internal dissonance 
and contradiction. The US Government isn’t the only one 
(Western or otherwise) struggling to present and maintain a 
consistent and coherent narrative in the face of technological 
change and disruption, but it’s one of the most visible. The US 
State Department’s internet freedom agenda is a potentially 
useful mechanism for promoting liberal values, and also 
does no harm to US tech giants that benefit from increasing 
global connectivity. However, US claims to support freedom 
(already weakened by the so-called War on Terror) have 
been undermined further by recent revelations of large-scale 
internet surveillance by the US and its allies.
Convergence between the major cyberpowers on the 
methods and tools of digital control could mean the Western 
consensus becomes less liberal, while countries such as 
China and Russia could soften their authoritarian stances 
mildly in recognition that too much overt control can be 
economically damaging (for example, by discouraging foreign 
investment). Among all the major actors, this would probably 
manifest through greater coercion and covert online 
surveillance (compared to today), as well as an increasingly 
militarised posture towards digital threats.
While the rhetorical justification for this shift would be 
couched in the now-familiar language of protection against 
threats such as foreign terrorists, in practice it would 
permit vastly increased domestic situational awareness. 
Adopted at scale (that is, among the major states), it would 
have significant negative implications for the health and 
development of the internet. It would likely influence the 
digital development of countries that are just beginning to 
experience the benefits of digital connectivity and may be 
undecided about taking an authoritarian or liberal stance 
towards cyberspace.
Drawing distinctions
There’s no complete convergence between these actors 
on the tools of online control; nor is that likely, given the 
difference in social and political structures.29 There are 
tangible and enduring differences between the Russian and 
Chinese stances on the one hand and the Western consensus 
on the other hand. They include relative levels of individual 
freedom vis-a-vis the state, as well as states’ adherence 
to the rule of law. For example, one recent US intelligence 
leak—that of Presidential Policy Directive 20, which sets the 
guiding principles for a range of offensive and defensive cyber 
operations—demonstrated exceptionally close attention to 
legal oversight (although one might question how effectively 
this works in practice, and across the intelligence community 
as a whole).30
There’s no question that both the perception and the reality 
of individual freedom and state adherence to the rule of law 
are more robust among the Western nations than in China 
and Russia. The quest for national sovereignty in cyberspace 
is another difference. The Western consensus doesn’t openly 
claim that the internet should be controlled, although 
some countries would very much like to surveil all of it. The 
question is, what factors may change that? If countries such 
as the US and UK had far less capability to monitor the global 
internet, would they, too, begin to explicitly advocate closer 
government control and sovereignty in cyberspace?
These differences are some comfort, but don’t fully explain 
the motivations for states to compete in cyberspace. Social 
and, more importantly, economic factors are exerting 
pressure on the international dialogue. Those factors must be 
taken into account when interpreting government positions 
on, for example, internet governance, intellectual property 
rights, or offensive military actions in cyberspace.
From an economic perspective, the global financial crisis 
hasn’t been kind to many Western states. The growing 
prosperity of China has benefited many of them, but 
Beijing’s military growth is a primary area of concern due to 
its potential for regional destabilisation. Cyberspace may 
reduce the relevance of time and space, but countries in 
the Asia–Pacific region, such as Australia, Japan and South 
Korea, have understandable concerns about the intentions of 
their largest neighbour.
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China is aiming for digital connectivity on a scale never before 
attempted. This will bring significant benefits but also permit 
the development of new tools of control that can be tested 
and exported to other authoritarian countries (which are just 
now getting connected). Western countries—the innovators 
and early developers of the internet—no longer have the 
option of dominating the internet governance debate by 
force of numbers. Who gets to define what the ‘real internet’ 
is, when China has as many internet users (about 564 million) 
as all of North America and Latin America combined? 31
Some differences aren’t as significant as they may appear. 
Governments are trying to catch up with the pace of 
change in cyberspace, and that could result in behaviours 
that appear different on the surface but hide similarities 
beneath. Adopting divergent positions and using strong 
rhetoric are popular options, for example when Russia 
wishes to distinguish itself from the US position on internet 
governance, or when the US wishes to claim the lead on 
‘internet freedom’. Below the surface lie common concerns 
about the internet as a threat to domestic security and 
stability, particularly because of the malign foreign influences 
that it may propagate, or because it’s a challenge to 
entrenched political interests.
Conclusions
The challenges that lie ahead are significant. They go beyond 
domestic politics and will influence the international debate 
on topics such as internet governance, digital security 
standards, privacy rights, intellectual property protection, 
and individual and journalistic freedoms. For newly 
connected countries, the obvious route will be to adopt 
positions similar to those of the major actors, such as the 
US, the UK, Russia or China, and attempt to gain maximum 
situational awareness of their domestic networks.
While the positions of the major actors fall on a spectrum 
of control, there’s a danger of that spectrum narrowing as 
illiberal convergence takes hold. Where undecided countries 
(‘swing states’) decide to place themselves on the spectrum 
depends on factors such as the economics of connectivity 
(is it cheaper to route traffic through specific countries?), 
the diversity of telecom providers, and of course on the 
level of domestic public engagement on issues of privacy 
and security.
Authoritarian governments will, at least in the short term, 
find it easier to persuade the swing states of the hypocrisy 
of the Western model of cybersecurity. From a political 
perspective, they’ll find willing ears among governments that 
already have authoritarian tendencies and among leaders 
who are looking to solidify their political control. From an 
economic perspective, they’ll gain traction with states 
that are contemplating major investment in such things as 
national broadband networks and are wavering between 
procurement from Chinese, US or European telecom giants.
Liberally minded states will find it more difficult to sustain 
their self-created image as the ethical stewards of the 
internet. They’ll come under increasing challenge from 
illiberal and undecided states in multilateral forums such 
as the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace, the Internet 
Governance Forum, the International Telecommunication 
Union and ICANN. Western companies will come under much 
closer scrutiny when attempting to enter new markets. 
They’re likely to more strongly resist the cooperative and 
coercive measures of Western governments. One example 
of this are the efforts by the US and UK signals intelligence 
agencies to influence the development of global digital 
security standards, thereby creating security vulnerabilities 
that allow for greater surveillance of online communication 
believed to be secure by individuals, businesses and other 
governments.32 This desire for unlimited access to the world’s 
data is eroding trust in Western tech giants, who have been 
forced to comply with demands from Western governments.33
Many governments and corporations are pursuing aspirations 
to control cyberspace. Despite political initiatives for internet 
freedom, or commercial initiatives to promote ‘frictionless 
sharing’ of the details of our lives, very few actions are based 
on purely altruistic motives. Many organisations are adapting 
to the changing digital environment and are using economic, 
social and political levers to enable or enhance their power. 
In many cases, that control requires the sacrifice of freedoms 
on the altar of security. And, although steps such as those are 
rarely so explicit, they’re exceedingly difficult to reverse.
The desire for unfettered government and corporate access 
to and control of information should be resisted strongly by 
all who aspire to live in a liberal society, and who believe that 
democracy and ubiquitous surveillance are incompatible. All 
internet users are implicated in this process, although many 
don’t realise it as they move through cyberspace leaving a 
trail of digital debris. These are challenges not only for the 
citizens of developed countries, who have become familiar 
with digital technologies, but also for the next several billion 
internet users (and more), who have yet to be connected.
Gone are the days when powerful Western nations could 
draw a clear dividing line between the behaviour of liberal 
and authoritarian states in cyberspace. It will require 
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sustained effort to raise public awareness, roll back 
government control, and reclaim the ground that’s been lost 
to fears of terrorism and worries over diminishing national 
power. This process will be lengthy, and there’s no single 
optimal balance between digital freedom and control. Each 
society must adapt its use of cyberspace to its societal 
norms, but as this process takes place, illiberal tendencies 
and their short- and long-term consequences should be 
recognised and challenged, and openness, transparency and 
public discussion of these issues should be encouraged.
Unlocking the potential of the information age requires more 
than bits and bytes. It needs committed individuals working 
to harness the power of those (agnostic) bits and bytes for 
the benefit of all users.
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